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Abstract
Our specific topic is Guantanamo, but in my brief remarks I would like to take the long view of
U.S. counterterrorism policy (including Guantanamo) and link it to the question of the compliance
of the United States, as today’s superpower, with international human rights norms, its relationship
to the United Nations and, speaking very broadly, international law norms as conceived by the
international community. This is partly a question of the relationship of U.S. counterterrorism
policy to international law. But it is also a question of the relationship of the superpower to the
rest of the international community, and in particular to the United Nations (“U.N.”). I propose
here merely to sketch out certain questions and possible answers. The inquiry I have in mind
is frankly speculative. It makes assumptions about international politics that the reader might
well find questionable. These remarks jump over those and many other hurdles in order to offer
a big picture of the relationships between superpower status and compliance, on the one hand,
and counterterrorism and international human rights norms, on the other. This version of the big
picture may be quite wrong, but I persist in believing that it is necessary sometimes to try to
see a big picture, if only to correct it. These topics require making certain assumptions about
the nature of the superpower, its power, and the future of its power, among other things, that
properly belong to the realm of international politics as much as law. A quick excursion through
the political and foreign policy journals, the op-ed pages, and political commentary reveals, of
course, vast disagreement on these questions. I spend more time than I should in Washington,
D.C. at meetings of foreign policy experts and am struck with how different, and often mutually
exclusive, the factual assessments of U.S. power are, even from people who share roughly the
same political commitments, left or right.
SPEECH
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY AND
SUPERPOWER COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS NORMS
Kenneth Anderson*
Introduction
Thank you for inviting me to participate in this important
discussion. Our specific topic is Guantanamo, but in my brief
remarks I would like to take the long view of U.S. counterterror-
ism policy (including Guantanamo) and link it to the question
of the compliance of the United States, as today's superpower,
with international human rights norms, its relationship to the
United Nations and, speaking very broadly, international law
norms as conceived by the international community. This is
partly a question of the relationship of U.S. counterterrorism
policy to international law. But it is also a question of the rela-
tionship of the superpower to the rest of the international com-
munity, and in particular to the United Nations ("U.N.").
I propose here merely to sketch out certain questions and
* Professor of law, Washington College of Law, American University, and research
fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University. The brief remarks that follow were
originally prepared for delivery to the Fordham International Law Journal's Guantanamo
Invitational Colloquium on November 29, 2006 that provides the material for this spe-
cial journal section. They are deliberately speculative and a little provocative-aimed at
fostering a discussion rather than offering a tightly argued, defensively closed position.
I have opted to leave them as remarks, as prepared for oral presentation, and lightly
footnoted, rather than converting them into a formal paper, because that informality
seems best to suit their open-ended nature and to emphasize that I remain open to
persuasion to different views on these matters.
These remarks have been revised following a presentation to the New York Univer-
sity Law School International Human Rights Colloquium, which took place on March 5,
2007, and my thanks to the invitation of Professor Philip Alston to take part and to the
commentators on that program. Thanks also to Peter Berkowitz, Amanda Frost, Tod
Lindberg, Scott Malcomson, Elisa Massimino, David Rieff, Matthew Waxman, Benjamin
Witles, and Ruth Wedgwood for helpful conversations on the themes of these remarks,
although none of them has any responsibility for the views expressed here and each of
them would vigorously dispute many issues. Thanks also to The Hoover Institution and
its director, John Raisian, for its support of my research work on these topics.
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possible answers. The inquiry I have in mind is frankly specula-
tive. It makes assumptions about international politics that the
reader might well find questionable. These remarks jump over
those and many other hurdles in order to offer a big picture of
the relationships between superpower status and compliance, on
the one hand, and counterterrorism and international human
rights norms, on the other. This version of the big picture may
be quite wrong, but I persist in believing that it is necessary
sometimes to try to see a big picture, if only to correct it.
These topics require making certain assumptions about the
nature of the superpower, its power, and the future of its power,
among other things, that properly belong to the realm of inter-
national politics as much as law. A quick excursion through the
political and foreign policy journals, the op-ed pages, and politi-
cal commentary reveals, of course, vast disagreement on these
questions. I spend more time than I should in Washington, D.C.
at meetings of foreign policy experts and am struck with how
different, and often mutually exclusive, the factual assessments
of U.S. power are, even from people who share roughly the same
political commitments, left or right.
1
A Superpower-For How Long? Or A Multipolar World?
"Disagreement" is not precisely the term. "Profound
unease" is perhaps better, because it better reflects uncertainties
about the very meaning of U.S. power even within broadly parti-
san political positions. It is not that the right has one analysis,
the left another, each side reasonably certain of its own position,
while disagreeing with the other. My personal perception of
Washington discussions today, on the contrary, is deep uncer-
tainty gnawing at everyone, even if the uncertainties lead them
in very different political and policy directions. How powerful,
really, is the United States, particularly as demonstrated by Iraq
and Afghanistan? How powerful, given the general sense of in-
ability to use this supposed power to deflect Iran or North Korea
from their nuclear courses? What difference does U.S. military
might make if it cannot win its wars in the grand strategic sense,
at least if the wars in question involve asymmetric warfare and
counterinsurgency? What about the ability of the United States
to affect internally generated crises that spill over to external
U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY
policy? As I write this, the wildly speculative, highly corrupt Chi-
nese stock market has undergone (unsurprisingly) a correction.'
This particular episode has thankfully subsided. But is this the
kind of internal economic shock that, if strongly amplified, if
severe enough, and occurring in a corrupt, authoritarian politi-
cal system, could cause a political crisis that might even bring
with it a disastrous confrontation in the Taiwan straits?2 What
kind of power does the superpower have to affect such a crisis of
internal economic and financial making? Will the United States
continue to have economic and military hegemony into the fu-
ture, or will that dominance erode in the face of rising powers
such as China? Will the world continue to be a superpower-dom-
inated world, or will it shift into a mode of great powers or re-
gional powers?
Perhaps the most important question is the last one: Are we
seeing the end of the United States-as-superpower era that char-
acterized the 1990s, and the emergence of a multipolar world?
David Rieff, for one, argues that the emerging world is one of
multipolarity, a world "in which China, the European Union,
Russia and India will have as much say about global order as will
the U.S."3 Some argue, as Michael Lind does, that such a multi-
polar world fosters the happy emergence of what Lind calls a
"concert of power" that would exhibit the useful virtues of power
while contraining the tempting hubris of the superpower;4 Rieff,
for his part, attacks that idea, as well as the also au courant idea of
a "concert of democracies,"' as being little more than updated
1. On February 27, 2007, the Shanghai composite index fell nearly nine percent,
the worst single-day drop in a decade, after reaching a 3,000-point milestone the day
before. See David Barboza, A Shockwavefrom Shanghai, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at Cl.
2. See generally NANCY BERNKOPF TUCKER, DANGEROUS STRAIT: THE U.S.-TAI-
WAN-CHINA CRISIS (2005); see also Wendy N. Duong, Following the Path of Oil: The Law of
the Sea or Realpolitik-What Good Does Law Do in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts?,
30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
3. David Rieff, Concerts and Silly Seasons, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Feb. 23, 2007, http:/
/www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-americanpower/concerts_4380.jsp (last visited
Mar. 28, 2007).
4. A concert of power, according to Lind, is a coalition or alliance of militarily and
economically powerful nations that does not have a permanent enemy, but exists to
decrease the likelihood of independent military action by one party against another.
Lind advocates for "regional" concerts of power, rather than one global or universal
concert of power. See MICHAEL LIND, THE AMERICAN WAY OF STRATEGY: U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY AND THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 171-88 (2006).
5. See generally G.John Ikenberry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging A World of Liberty
under Law: US. National Security in the 21st Centuy (Final Report of the Princeton Pro-
2007]
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versions of the same madness that animated the U.N. at its crea-
tion in 1945-the "preposterous fantasy," Rieff says, "that the
great powers would ensure world peace through a military com-
mittee in which Russians and Americans would cooperate."6
Rieff concludes, quite rightly, that multipolarity, if it emerges as
he predicts, "is by definition competitive. The idea that somehow
the interests of great powers can be reconciled is no more rea-
sonable today than it was in 1914, or, for that matter, in 1945."'
I have no special crystal ball as to the short or long term
condition of U.S. power. Yet the nature of the discussion re-
quires offering a view of precisely that. It is difficult to talk about
what compliance by the United States as the superpower means
without addressing the issue of its power: whether its power
gives it special leverage; whether it has, or ought to have, special
responsibilities and special prerogatives as the order-guarantee-
ing hegemon, or whether all of that is simply an illegitimate leap
from power to status; and whether, and for how long, that power
might last. Perhaps Rieff is right about the decline of super-
power status and the emergence of a multipolar world. But in
that case-if you accept, as I do, that Rieff is right that a multipo-
lar world is by definition competitive-then compliance with in-
ternational human rights norms becomes rather harder, not eas-
ier, to attain. I proceed in the remainder of these remarks on
the assumption, however, that we deal in the short term at least
with an on-going superpower, the United States, in order to ask
what the relationship is between superpower status and compli-
ance with those norms, in an age in which terrorism is a matter
of serious concern to the United States and others. Rieff may
well be right; I will, however, accept the continuation of the sta-
tus quo of the United States as superpower as the basis for dis-
cussion about compliance and counterterrorism.
Given the United States as continuing superpower, we
might put the question of superpower compliance with interna-
tional norms in two ways. First, the issue can be conceived as a
strategic question: What are strategies for getting the superpower
to comply with a certain set of international norms, where we
ject on National Security, The Princeton Project Papers, 2007), available at http://
www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf.
6. Rieff, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Id. (emphasis original).
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already agree as to the meaning of those norms, their fundamen-
tal interpretation, and with the proposition that the United
States ought to comply in the ways "we"-meaning that vague
reification called the "international community"-think it ought
to comply? I am willing to go partway down that strategic road
for purposes of discussion-but not all the way, because I proba-
bly have some important areas of disagreement as to the mean-
ing and interpretation of various norms. I assume that it is partly
because of those perceived disagreements, and the desire to put
them squarely on the table, that I have been invited to talk today.
I will therefore try to indicate some areas where I believe we'disa-
gree-and the United States government disagrees-as to what
the norms at issue are and what they mean. Second, however,
the issue of superpower compliance can be framed as the ques-
tion of what is the relationship between the United States as the
superpower and the rest of the international realm, broadly con-
ceived-the international system, the U.N. system, international
law as "others" see it, international norms as the "international
community" sees them, and the "international community."
I am being deliberately vague about what the "others" are,
in part because I think it is a sliding concept, invoked as a figure
of opposition, a reification without a clearly defined point of be-
ginning or end. It is a constant trope to invoke the United States
against the rest of the world, and the rest of the world as against
it, but it is far harder to say precisely what "world" one means.
Once the binary division is examined in its particularities, in any
given circumstance, there is indeed a core opposition to the
hegemon, not just among the United States' plain enemies, but
more importantly a core of deep opposition among those either
friendly in principle or at least not actively hostile. Yet there are
also many points of overlapping interest and shared values. It is
precisely the shifting and mixing of "now we're with you" and
"now we're against you" that creates a considerable part of the
tension-it turns opposition, on either side, into a sense of be-
trayal. Whereas with its enemies, the United States always knows
precisely where it stands.
2.
The Conjoined U.S.-International System
Another way of framing the superpower versus multipolar
2007]
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world-one which offers some explanations-is through the fa-
miliar terms of classical international relations theory. That, in
the hands of Morgenthau,8 or Waltz,9 or Mearsheimer,' ° among
others, each with his or her particular version of the story, tells
us that the international system of States can be a condition of
anarchy among States, 1 or, under some circumstances, it might
be dominated by a hegemon able to enforce a certain amount of
status quo order. 12 Classical international relations theory also
offers various possibilities for what can happen to hegemonic or-
der when that order is perceived as threatening-smaller States,
feeling threatened or seeing opportunity, might band together
at least temporarily to counteract the hegemon. 3 Or the hege-
mon might exhaust itself internally. 4 Or a new power might
arise to challenge hegemony." There are many possibilities. 6 I
have no special idea where to place the United States today in
such an array of realist paradigms. It does seem to me, however,
contrary to pure realist international relations theory, that at
least in the short to medium term, an analysis of U.S. power in
the world must take account of at least the following "extra-real-
ist" considerations:
The role of values and ideological considerations in the
world today, partly reflected around the ideology of
human rights, but also increasingly around other ideolo-
gies, most powerfully political Islamism, but also in such
ideologies as democratic authoritarianism d la Putin or
Chavez.' 7 These ideologies carry independent causal
8. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
AND PEACE (4th ed. 1967).
9. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1967).
10. JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001).
11. See WALTZ, supra note 9, at 114.
12. See ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POUTICS (1981); see also ROB-
ERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 32-46 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2005) (1984).
13. See MORGENTHAU, supra note 8, at 175-80.
14. See GILPIN, supra note 12, at 159-75.
15. See id. at 186-210.
16. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LAYNE, THE PEACE OF ILLUSIONS: AMERICAN GRAND STRAT-
EGY FROM 1940 TO THE PRESENT 143 (2006) ("[I]n today's unipolar era we should, and
do, see others responding to U.S. preponderance by engaging in terrorism, soft balanc-
ing, opaque balancing, and semi-hard balancing") (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Vladimir Boxer et al., Putin's First Year: How Good, How Bad? (The
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Roundtable Discussion, May 10, 2001),
available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/publication.cfm?program=CORE&ctype=
event.reports&itemid=84; INT'L CRISIS GROUP, VENEZUELA: HEADED TOWARD CIVIL
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weight in the behavior of States, international actors, and
sub-State actors that affect State behavior.
* The role of values and ideologies in U.S. politics, as with
other large democracies, whether France or Germany, In-
dia orJapan. It cannot all be simplified to "material" State
interests.18
* The discernible reluctance in U.S. political culture to play
the role of overt imperial power1 9 (leaving aside Latin
America), even when Niall Ferguson or Michael Ignatieff
thinks the United States should 2 -a reluctance so consid-
erable that it raises a question as to whether the term
"hegemon" actually fits U.S. behavior.
* The long-standing response by other countries to the
United States' cultural reluctance to be an overt imperial-
ist. That response-a crucial feature of the "international
system" as it exists today-amounts to acquiescence in the
U.S. security role; as Michael Mandelbaum correctly says
on this point, other generally friendly States trust, not this
policy, but rather the underlying cultural tendency-one
which tends to revert to the cultural mean over time-
against what realism might otherwise be thought to dic-
tate. They therefore tacitly accept the U.S. security status
quo, and think it worth more, with relatively few costs or
demands for imperial tribute, than what such interna-
tional institutions as the Security Council or international
law or the international system construed without U.S. he-
gemony might offer.2 1
WAR? (May 10, 2004), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&id=27329
(last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
18. Here, I am tiptoeing up to, but not entering into, the debate at the core of the
Goldsmith and Posner version of realism, which asserts that States act in their interests,
but then includes in interests matters beyond "material" considerations alone. See gener-
ally JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005).
For my response, see Kenneth Anderson, Remarks by an Idealist on the Realism of the Limits
of International Law, 34 GAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 2, 253 (2006).
19. See, e.g., Sankaran Krishna, An Inarticulate Imperialism: Dubya, Afghanistan and
the American Century, 1 ALTERNATrvES TURK. J. INr'L REL. (Summer 2002), http://
www.alternativesjournal.net/volumel/number2/krishna.htm (last visited Apr. 11,
2007) (arguing that "Americans regard themselves as reluctant and inexperienced im-
perialists, if they see themselves as imperial at all-whereas the best that can be said is
that they are certainly the most inarticulate and unself-reflexive of the tribe").
20. See, e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EM-
PIRE (2004); Michael Ignatieff, The American Empire; The Burden, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 5,
2003, at 22.
21. See MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: How AMERICA ACTS AS THE
WORLD'S GOVERNMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2005). I think Mandelbaum is wrong on
2007]
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" A firm belief running across the partisan range in main-
stream U.S. politics-Democrats as well as Republicans,
liberals as well as conservatives-in some form of U.S. ex-
ceptionalism, an exceptionalism not based on the fact of
power alone, but on a belief in its internal moral order
legitimating a certain moral place in the world, however
differently the partisan actors within U.S. politics interpret
that exceptionalism. 2 2 This may be folly, the "fantastic
dogma," that Rieff says it is, but I take it that he would
grant, as a descriptive matter, that it accurately captures a
deeply-held view of the U.S. political center. 3
" A U.S. belief-again, broadly held across the mainstream
political spectrum, Democratic as well as Republican-
that international law, norms, and institutions are to be
treated and interpreted pragmatically, according to the
"broad-minded" interests of a superpower interested in
status quo order, stability, and the promotion of economic
interconnectedness-and against, despite the rhetoric
sometimes offered by Democrats, making a fetish of inter-
national law or institutions for their own sake. It is not the
narrow and material self-interest of rising powers such as
China-selling, for example, its Security Council veto for
commercial gain in Sudan-but it is a view of the interna-
tional system, the U.N., and international law according to
pragmatic criteria centered in, not precisely sovereign
State interest, but the broader interests of the democratic
many, many things in this book, but not on this point. Every time I make this point-a
quite ordinary one in the minds of many states' policymakers-I am told of all the
many injustices and burdens and slights which the United States' allies suffer as impe-
rial tribute. Nearly all of them are frankly minor matters of politics and perception-
few ever raise what might be thought serious economic tribute, e.g., the U.S. dollar sta-
tus as the world's reserve currency.
22. Alexis de Tocqueville originally coined the term "American Exceptionalism" in
1831 to describe the U.S. perception that the United States differs qualitatively and has
a special destiny different from other nations due to its unique origins, evolution and
distinctive political and religious institutions. See 2 ALEXIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 36-37 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., A.A. Knopf 1948) (1985); see
also Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1497, 1481 n.4
(2003) (noting the history of the term "American Exceptionalism"). For a thorough
analysis of the evolution of "American Exceptionalism" including its importance in the
United States today, see SEYMOUR MARTIN LiPsET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE
EDGED SWORD (1996); see also Shane B. Kelbley, Note, Reason Without Borders: How Trans-
national Values Cannot Be Contained, 28 FoRDnAM INT'L L. J. 1595, 1625 (2005) (discuss-
ing the concept of "American Exceptionalism" in relation to the reluctance of U.S.
courts to cite international law).
23. See Reiff, supra note 3.
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sovereign State which also happens to be the superpower,
and with a range of special considerations.
24
All these bullet points, especially the last four, can be and
are disputed. One might think matters were very much other-
wise if all one were to consider, for example, was the debate in
the Security Council over Iraq. 25 But when one looks to the me-
dium term behavior of States, I suggest that this description is
reasonably close to the truth of how States actually, in fact, act
today. There is a kind of equilibrium in which such structures as
the U.N. and its norm-system, the international system, and the
international State system-all these partially overlapping cir-
cles, operate with a certain weight and effect, while simultane-
ously being limited, not precisely by the power of the United
States coercing or prohibiting them from acting, but instead by
the preferences of significant actors, who prefer the implicit secur-
ity order offered by the United States irrespective of the U.N.,
the Security Council, and the whole edifice of institutions and
norm-structures giving rise to the ideal of collective security.2 6
They can loudly pay lip service to the international system pre-
cisely because they trust for their security elsewhere.
The existence of a hegemon offering security puts a limit on
actually testing what the international system on its own might,
or might not, accomplish if States overall had to look to it for
security. Does anyone want genuinely to rest the Thucydidean
"argument upon your safety" on the logic of collective U.N. se-
curity? 27 There are populations who have no choice but to do
24. See, e.g., the last several speeches on foreign policy by Democratic presidential
candidate Barak Obama. U.S. exceptionalism, foreign policy idealism, unilateral op-
tions to use U.S. power-yet, there is a certain U.S., not just partisan, view of U.S.
power. See Senator Barack Obama, Address to Chicago Council on Global Affairs (Apr.
23, 2007), available at http://clinicalfreedom.org/Obama001.htm; see also Jeff Zeleny,
Obama, in Foreign Policy Speech, Urges U.S. Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2007 at A22.
25. See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726 (Mar. 26, 2003);
U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4726th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4726 (Resumption 1) (Mar. 27,
2003); see also Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFF., May/
June 2003 (discussing the Security Council debate on Iraq and arguing that it exempli-
fies the failure of the United Nations to operate effectively in the face of U.S.
hyperpower).
26. See Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupataion, 24 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L.
1, 38 (2006) (noting that states have both altruistic and selfish reasons for seeking the
assistance of the United States and that the United States similarly prefers a multilateral
approach to occupations).
27. See II Thucydides, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WARS (Hobbes trans.)
(1839); see also MichaelJ. Glennon, UN Reform: Platonism, Adaptivism, and Illusion in UN
20071
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that-the inhabitants of Darfur,28 for example, and before that,
the men and boys of Srebrenica. 29 There are also, to be fair,
more positive examples as well evident in the relative successes
of U.N. peacekeeping missions in recent years. But it is perhaps
not surprising that a significant number of the world's States,
starting with Europe, have not, since 1945 (or even since 1990),
been willing to test the naked proposition of collective security,
fearing precisely the outcome that the international system so
often amounts to-insincere promises and easy defection. As
measured by their behavior at least, they prefer to trust, grudg-
ingly, the superpower's offer of an undemanding order over the
uncertainties of collective action-so much so that they neither
look to nor spend significantly for their own defense, but instead
let the superpower do it. This does not stop everyone from
loudly complaining, sometimes justifiably and sometimes not,
about the superpower's behavior. But the complaining is inte-
grally part of the logic of insincere promising and insincere pro-
testing. Likewise the attempt to bend the superpower to the will
of smaller powers through a combination of ideological flattery
("you can be civilized like us") or the ideological guilt trip ("we
won't love you anymore").
One may, and indeed should, treat each individual dispute
with the United States on its own merits, of course. My point
concerning the relation of the superpower to the international
system, the U.N. and its norm system, is a different one, and
merely a descriptive observation of how the system works over
time. The "conjoined system" of U.S. hegemony and the inter-
national system-and the United Nations in particular, as a
place for countries (and international elites, non governmental
organizations ("NGOs") and international civil servants, not just
Reform, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 613, 613 (questioning whether U.N. institutions can adequately
provide collective security); JAMES ROBERT HUNTLEY, PAX DEMOCRATICA: A STRATEGY
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 131, 161 (1998) (arguing that the U.N. is incapable of providing
for international security).
28. See Glennon, supra note 25, at 623.
29. Press Release, United Nations, In Montreal, Deputy Secretary-General Invites States
to Give Greater Dynamism to UN to Protect World's People from Danger, DSG/SM/211 (Jan. 22
2004) (noting that the U.N. has to be better at formulating collective responses so as to
prevent mass killings such as those observed in Rwanda and Srebrenica); see also Henry
F. Carey, U.S. Domestic Politics and the Emerging Humanitarian Intervention Policy: Haiti,
Bosnia, and Kosovo, WORLD AFF., Sep. 22, 2001, at 72 (citing Richard Holbrooke as blam-
ing the massacres at Srebrenica on the U.N.'s interpretation of the laws on the use of
force).
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countries) to get angry and let off steam while not intending, not
really, to challenge the fundamental bases of that conjoined sys-
tem (insincere protesting, again)-has, it seems to me, reached
a fairly immoveable equilibrium. A lot of key players are in-
vested in both the security and the protesting, invested in depen-
dency and insincerity. If the question, therefore, is getting the
superpower to go along with a set of norms defined by the inter-
national system, s° then it is relevant to consider the idea that the
international system is not actually one of everyone profoundly
frustrated and angry-certainly not to the point of actually
changing it, or challenging the superpower by organizing
against it materially rather than merely symbolically. Instead, it
is what it has long been, a system in relatively stable equilibrium,
in which the shouting, and the periodic amplification of the
shouting, is part of how the system works over time.
Could all this change? Of course. The United States could
gradually lose the economic power required to be the security-
providing hegemon. Other powers could gradually arise, China,
India, etc."1 The United States could gradually lose ideological
steam to maintain its place in the system. The logic of collective
security could start to look more attractive to key players cur-
rently under the U.S. security blanket. Risk assessments differ,
too-Western Europe at this moment is worried about Russia
and its energy supplies, which worries the United States far less
than North Korea or China is, after all, to Europe, just a large
market far away and unthreatening. All sorts of things can and
will happen over time. But the system for now exhibits a certain
stability, provided one sees it as a conjoined system. Key players,
even when they protest, are also deeply invested in the system for
their own reasons. Change, particularly change of norms, is not
easy, because insofar as the norms are specifically part of the val-
ues of the international system, appeals for change inevitably
raise questions of whether the participants are genuinely serious,
or whether instead the exercise is mostly part of the interna-
tional system's (and especially the United Nations') inherent cy-
cle of insincere promising-insincere protesting-easy defection.
30. I reiterate, whatever that actually is; but I will take it on the terms that its propo-
nents seem to intend.
31. SeeJohn E. Rielly, America Unbound: The Future of American Hegemony, 30 VT. L.
REv. 123, 135-41 (discussing the likelihood of China replacing the United States as a
hegemonic State).
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3.
The Carnival of the New Liberal Realism
When one looks inside U.S. politics, across the spectrum of
mainstream politics over time, by contrast, that politics is charac-
terized by a sense of treating the international system, the U.N.,
and international norms in highly pragmatic ways-a sense of
pragmatism far more broadly shared than the bitter arguments
required by today's theater of partisanship might superficially
suggest. The differences are not entirely rhetorical. An adminis-
tration of Clinton or Obama would behave with respect to the
international system, and particularly the U.N. and its norm sys-
tem, differently in some respects from an administration of Mc-
Cain or Giuliani. But it is easy and tempting for many-wanting
to make preferences into description and on the basis of heated
rhetoric-to overstate the substantive differences. The main-
stream center of U.S. politics does not fetishize the U.N. or inter-
national law or the international system.
Let me try to put this point about shared, rather than bat-
tling, views of the international system and international law
within the U.S. political mainstream in a quite different way.
Neo-conservatism is currently the intellectual whipping boy for
all that has gone wrong, or apparently gone wrong, in U.S. for-
eign policy.3 2 Everyone today seems to be dreaming up new al-
ternatives, at least in Washington, in universities, think tanks,
and policy centers. I exaggerate, of course, but for the moment,
at least, "everyone" seems to agree that (conservative) idealism is
the problem and today we all, conservatives and liberals, but par-
ticularly liberals, seek to distinguish ourselves from neo-conser-
vatism, by turning ourselves into realists for a good while, just as
we should have remained realists after 9/11, particularly about
Iraq. We should have, on what we might call the "new liberal
realism," accommodated to Saddam and his sons; we should
have continued to seek containment instead of removal.
Indeed, containment and accommodation, and the return
to an entirely instrumental balance of power politics that disre-
gards the nature of the regime and its rulers appears to be the
new order of the day with respect to pretty much every bad re-
gime; the only regime, apparently, that cannot be accommo-
32. See Rieff, supra note 3, at 1.
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dated in the new liberal realism is the Bush Administration.
One can represent that attitude as merely a realist bow to the
fact that in Iraq the United States has had its nose rubbed in the
limits of what military action alone can get you in the way of
cultural change and what it cannot; still, the new liberal realism
represents a more profound disillusionment than that, more
than just a disillusionment with military solutions to problems,
but a disillusionment with muscular idealism as such.
By "muscular idealism," I mean a very particular and unat-
tractive feature of the new liberal realism. It is realism insisted
upon with respect to actions by the United States as a democratic
sovereign State. What, after all, was the idealism of the Bush
doctrine? It was the Bush fils repudiation of the Bush pere bal-
ance of power realism among authoritarian, corrupt, and mur-
derous dictators in the Middle East, on the grounds that this "re-
alism" was a core part of what set the terms for 9/11. That ideal-
ism is shoved aside in the new liberal realism. We are offered
instead the canonization of James "No Dog in this Fight" Baker
by-God help us all-U.S. liberals.3 Yet although the United
States is now supposed to be governed by the hard requirements
of realism, the new liberal realists nonetheless want to have their
cake and eat it, too. They want to claim not to have lost their
idealism. Their idealism, however, is now relocated to the place
least likely to bear any idealist fruit-the proven ineffectuality of
the international system. Assert one's idealism through the U.N.
and one's allies-well, it is unlikely to be tested in action, be-
cause it so rarely gets that far. The idealism of the international
system is impeccably credentialed idealism and a practical guar-
antee of ineffectiveness. Meanwhile, the idealism of democratic
sovereigns-which, in regard to muscle, means the United
States-is henceforth to be governed by the propositions of real-
ism.
This gets it exactly backwards, to be sure-but it does so in a
way that allows the new liberal realists to claim, fantastically, both
labels at the same time. Among realists, Rieff, however, stands
alone because he, at least, does not demand to have it both ways.
33. I refer to Baker's famous-infamous, then, in the eyes of idealistic human
rights oriented liberals-formulation of why the United States should stay out of the
Yugoslavian conflict in the early 1990s. SeeJonathan Eyal, It Was a Test Case, And America
Failed, INT'L HER. TRIB. Apr. 15, 1992; see alsoJohn O'Sullivan, West Could Have Stopped
Milosevic, CHIC. SUN TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006.
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And he is one of the very few-if not the only one-who has
honestly acknowledged that he has, in fact, changed his mind. 4
Should not the new liberal realists, if they are as honest as Rieff,
do the same, rather than claim to have it both ways?
The new liberal realism is profoundly unattractive-as
though liberal idealists, long constrained by their moral Calvin-
ism to worship at the altar of severe Wilsonian idealism, were
suddenly freed, through the failure of conservative idealism, the
failure of neo-conservatism, to celebrate a Carnival of realism,
petit moralistes, catechists of the Categorical Imperative, until now
sternly watched over and instructively smacked on the head to
prevent dozing off in the Church of Human Rights by people
like Michael Ignatieff, Kenneth Roth, Samantha Power, Geoffrey
Robinson, Jimmy Carter, Claire Short, Louise Arbour, the semi-
narians of human rights idealism suddenly freed to dance drunk
in the avenues of dubious virtue, to party in the sinful precincts
of hard realism usually reserved to the morally benighted Brent
Scowcroft and James Baker, freed to expound on the virtues of
accommodation, containment, stability, and interests, freed to
expatiate realist necessity, game theory, instrumentalism, ra-
tional choice; freed not to have to sing hosannas at every waking
moment to the glory of Moral Ends and Human Rights Univer-
salism, and freed to maintain the necessity of "our so-
nofabitch."35 Think Wilber Luce on a drunken bender.36
I also do not think the Carnival will last. Liberals and demo-
crats in the United States will sober up and rediscover-the
sooner the better-that they are committed long term to certain
values that will require means actually (and not merely rhetori-
cally) adequate to pursue them. The means of that idealism will
have to be something more effective than the "international sys-
tem." The targets of that idealism will have to be more than sim-
ply going after the Bush Administration, which, in any case, will
not be around that much longer. But essential to understanding
34. See DAVID RIEFF, AT THE PoINT OF A GUN: DEMOCRATIC DREAMS AND ARMED
INTERVENTION 7 (2005) (in the introduction, the author notes that the book is "an argu-
ment against [my] previous conviction that humanitarian military intervention,
whether to alleviate massive suffering or rectify grave human rights violations, should
be a norm that a Tony Blair or, indeed, a Kofi Annan seems to believe it either has
already or should become in international relations").
35. SeeJonathan Freedland, Karimor: He's Our Sonofabitch, GUARDIAN (UK), May 18,
2005.
36. See ERIc METAXAS, AMAZING GRACE (2007).
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the long-term center of U.S. foreign policy is understanding how
much of neoconservatism is part of that long term center, and
part of the ideals even liberals espouse, or will again one of these
days. Walk through Francis Fukuyama's After the Neocons.17 It of-
fers a useful critical guide to the underlying propositions of ne-
oconservatism, and what you will find is that most-not all, but
most-of them will show up again in idealisms of both right and
left in the United States, even if under other names, because
there is an irreducible idealist strain in U.S. foreign policy that
will not go away.3"
The point is this: The United States' superpower status is
irretrievably bound up in its own mind, in its political center, in
its mainstream politics, both Democratic and Republican, with
the moral legitimacy of that power. One may scoff at that, shud-
der even, think it supremely hypocritical, accept it as the fact of
power without legitimacy, regard it as an exercise in gross wick-
edness, etc.-but it would be a profound mistake to imagine that
a change of administration in the United States will deeply alter
that internal perception. Superpower emphasizes "power." U.S.
politics, by contrast, even with the bitter debates over the moral-
ity of U.S. actions in the world from Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib,
emphasizes U.S. legitimacy. A new Democratic administration is
unlikely to draw from the experience post 9/11 that the United
States is a superpower by reason of power alone, but instead the
quite different lesson that it has to clean up the moral mess of
the Bush Administration in order to continue what it, along with
the U.S. "vital center," has long seen as the legitimate interna-
tional moral order-a flexible, pragmatic international system
that consists of a sometimes messy, sometimes inconsistent, fun-
damentally conjoined United States-international system. In the
collective mind of that U.S. vital center, the international com-
munity, the U.N., international law are not-as they are for
37. FRANCES FUKUyAMA, AFTER THE NEOCONS: AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS (2006).
38. Id. I highly recommend the Fukuyama book. I have written two reviews of it,
and as time goes by, I have decided that those reviews are actually too harsh. It is a very
insightful book, not just for its dissection of neoconservatism, but for its attempt to
sketch a future foreign policy. For the short review, see Kenneth Anderson, Doomed
Internationalist, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (LONDON), (2006), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=940309. The long version, with a lengthy
discussion of multiculturalism and terrorism, and also a much more developed discus-
sion of the "new liberal realism," appears as Kenneth Anderson, Goodbye to All That? A
Requiem for Neo-Conservatism, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 277 (2007).
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some on the U.S. right-irrelevant. Just as they are not-as they
are for some on the U.S. left-overriding. It is a messily con-
joined system.
If all that is even approximately so, the question then be-
comes, what is the status and role of international human rights,
particularly as understood and interpreted by the human rights
movement, Western European governments, and international
bodies, for new, post-Bush Administration regimes in the United
States, in a continuing U.S. claim of "superpowerness" that also
asserts legitimacy? The U.S. political center partakes directly of
a central proposition that Fukuyama identifies with neocon-
servatism,39 but would be better understood as a central proposi-
tion of all mainstream U.S. political idealism about the interna-
tional world-the conjoined U.S. belief in both the legitimacy of
the exercise of U.S. power as a force for generally good order in
the world, and the U.S. exceptionalism that goes along with that.
Perhaps I am wrong, but I do not suppose that this fundamental
internal perception, held across the U.S. political spectrum, has
been altered for the long term, even by the reign of the Bush
Administration.
4.
Interpreting Human Rights Norms in the War on Terror
Given the concept of a conjoined system, it is perhaps easier
to understand, from the view of the U.S. political center, that
arguments from human rights proponents neither fall on deaf
ears nor automatically win the day. It would be a logically more
coherent, but politically less satisfying, system if it were all one or
the other. But even within the arguments over human rights
norms and United States compliance with them, it would be a
mistake to assume that there is complete or automatic agree-
ment over what those obligations are, what they mean, how they
are to be interpreted, and whether and to what extent the
United States is actually out of compliance with them since the
beginning of the U.S. war on terror. There is not.
The war on terror is central to the debate over the compli-
ance of the superpower with human rights and humanitarian law
norms because it goes to the heart of the values debate. That
39. See generally FUKuVAMA, supra note 37.
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values debate is often framed as though it were between moral
values and merely prudential claims of security. Security is a
core value of any political community, however, no less so than
individual human rights. Moreover, the wickedness of terrorists
in attacking civilians is not simply a matter of a political commu-
nity prudently protecting itself, but also of fighting against evil
and wrongdoing. At issue, in other words, are values on each
hand, which act as yet another reason why the question of
counterterrorism is central to the question of superpower com-
pliance.
That said, I am going to skip over all the various ways in
which the United States is claimed to be in violation of various
human rights standards, including law of armed conflict stan-
dards.4" I am likewise going to skip over as well all the various
views and responses of the United States in reply.4 Those de-
bates have been stated and re-stated; I will simply say that, in
general, I share the legal views of John Bellinger.4 2 His view,
roughly summarized, is that international law is considerably
more complicated than many critics of the United States have
made out-which is to say, he restates the traditional U.S. view
40. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilians Aug-
mentees, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for De-
fining Permissible Civilian Battlefield Functions (unpublished manuscript 2006), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=895525.
41. In response to accusations of human rights violations at Abu Ghraib and other
detention centers going beyond individual violations by individual soldiers to reflect a
systematic policy of the Bush Administrtation on torture and mistreatment of battlefield
detainees, then-White House spokesman Scott McClellan said in 2005:
I think the allegations are ridiculous, and unsupported by the facts. The
United States is leading the way when it comes to protecting human rights and
promoting human dignity. We have liberated 50 million people in Iraq and
Afghanistan. We have worked to advance freedom and democracy in the
world so that people are governed under a rule of law, that there are protec-
tions in place for minority rights, that women's rights are advanced so that
women can fully participate in societies where now they cannot."
Alan Cowell, U.S. "Thumbs Its Nose"At Rights, Amnesty Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2005, at
A10; see also Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States Double
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2 D 365 (1998) (discussing and modestly defending U.S. resis-
tance to the application of international human rights law to itself).
42. A convenient place to get some of those views summarized is at the Opinio
Juris Blog, where Bellinger guest-blogged during several weeks in January 2007-a
quite remarkable exchange of views between Bellinger, a number of guest respondents
from the international law community, and many, often highly erudite, commentators.
See Roger Alford, OpinioJuris Welcomes State Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger, OPIN1O
Jumis, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/chain_1169503291.shtml (last visited Apr. 1,
2007) (Bellinger's guest blogs are included on this web page).
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that international law is much more flexible and pragmatic and
able to be shaped to new circumstances, including transnational
jihadist terror, than many critics of the Bush Administration
have been willing to admit..3 I do not join Bellinger at every
turn-after all, he is in the position of defending the Adminis-
tration at every turn-but I agree wholly with that basic starting
point.
I do join with the Administration's critics, however, in say-
ing that the war on terror does not, in fact, meet the require-
ments to constitute a war in the legal sense as such, any more
than the Cold War was for forty long years a war in the legal
sense to which, at every moment and in every encounter, the
laws of war applied.44 That was not how the United States under-
stood the concept of war and the law of war in the Cold War.
And it seems to me that we should adopt the same understand-
ing now-a strategic sense of a long struggle, usefully under-
stood and analyzed as war, but not across all time and in all
places constituting a legal armed conflict. I understand and sym-
pathize with the impulse to treat it that way in the period imme-
diately after 9/11-but, five years on, I do not think it meets the
legal tests as a whole, global enterprise at this point, and there is
relatively little to be gained today by insisting that it does.
The U.S. Government, the Administration as well as Con-
gress, has begun tacitly to recognize this, evidenced, for exam-
ple, by the way in which the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA") 4 5 defined various terrorist offenses. The MCA, for ex-
ample, relies increasingly not upon the international law defini-
tion of a combatant-one who takes active or direct part in hos-
tilities 6 -but instead upon concepts such as "material sup-
43. See John Bellinger, Wrap Up Discussion II, OPINIOJURIs (Jan. 25, 2007) http://
www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1169777773.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2007).
44. That said, it is also important to recognize the undeniable strength of the De-
partment of State's view that once the trigger of war is pulled in a legal sense-as hap-
pened on 9/11-a hiatus in attacks does not mean it is switched off again. The view
that once war is legally "on," it runs until it is definitively over is a powerful argument,
undeniably so.
45. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA"), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600 (2006).
46. Under Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, combatants are all organized
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to a Party to a
conflict, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recog-
nized by an adverse Party. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Pro-
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port."4 7  Those latter concepts-and related concepts of
conspiracy, etc.-are the relevant concepts for conducting effec-
tive counterterrorism-but they are not fundamentally concepts
of the law of war. They are instead, rather, concepts of a sui
generis domestic legal regime of counterterrorism, about which
one may raise important questions of its interaction with norms
of international human rights.
What I particularly share with Bellinger, however, is a view
that Bush Administration critics are far too quick to boldly as-
sert, in nearly every instance, that the Administration is in viola-
tion of international law and human rights and humanitarian
law norms, as though in all these cases the meaning, applicabil-
ity, interpretation, etc., of those norms were transparent. I un-
derstand the critics taking the moral high ground in the face of
the torture memos,48 the initial insistence of the United States
that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to what the United
States itself termed as war as a legal matter, among other things.
On the other hand, I am unwilling to turn around and say, well,
from now on the critics' views of what these norms mean con-
trols over those of the U.S. Government. I entirely share, for
example, the State Department's long-held views of the territo-
rial application of the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights ("ICCPR").4 I do not think the Torture Convention
is self-explanatory as to what actual, concrete behaviors consti-
tute torture; the Convention does not come with a user's manual
to what actual Central Intelligence Agency interrogation prac-
tices constitute torture. Someone has to interpret these things,
tocol I) art. 43, opened for signature June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Civilians enjoy gen-
eral protection against dangers arising from military operations unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities. Id. art. 51. The United States has always-
and correctly, in my view-declined to join Protocol I, but it does not dispute the fun-
damental definition of a combatant noted here.
47. MCA § 950v(b) (24).
48. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Editorial, Lawyers' Standards in Free Fall: The Amoral
Torture Memo is Just One Example, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at B13; William Plaff, What
We've Lost: George W. Bush and the Price of Torture, HARPERS, Nov. 2005, at 50-55. The
torture memos are a series of documents released in 2004 that discuss U.S. interroga-
tion policy. See Conor O'Clery, U.S. Reveals Memos on Interrogation, IRISH TiMES, June 24,
2004, at 11; see also Archive of Unclassified Documents Detailing U.S. Interrogation
Policy, http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/index.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2007) (containing all public documents from the U.S. agencies on interroga-
tion policy and practice).
49. See Jose E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 175, 179-81
(2006).
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and while one can have long legal arguments regarding who and
in what fora, more important to me in this discussion is that a
large part of the argument lies not solely in the substance of
such questions, but instead in how international norms are con-
ceived in the first place. Is there room for the pragmatism and
flexibility that the United States (and not the United States
alone) has traditionally taken to be inherently part of interna-
tional law and its application? Notably missing from the discus-
sion, after all, is the possibility that, given the inherent ambiguity
of at least some of these norms and their meanings, their inter-
pretation and meanings are being formulated in some part by
the state practice of the United States itself.
5.
The Future of Counterterrorism and
Human Rights Compliance
For all the importance of these questions, I do not propose
to pursue them further in these brief remarks. They are vital
questions of practice today, accountability for practices in the
past, yes-but what concerns me far more at this point is what
the relationship of international human rights and U.S.
counterterrorism policies should look like into the future. Part
of the intractability of counterterrorism policy as a political de-
bate in the United States today, at least, is that everyone is highly
invested, either as critic or defender, in past practices and argu-
ments over past practices. This makes it difficult, sometimes im-
possible, to look forward to what counterterrorism policy ought
to be. No one can propose or admit a change from what they
have done or criticized having been done in the past without a
damaging admission. While the possibility of a change of U.S.
administration, Democratic or Republican, offers a chance to
reformulate and re-conceive basic counterterrorism policy, that
is unlikely to happen unless at least part of the debate refocuses
on the going-forward.
Let me therefore suggest, in rapid fire, bullet point form,
what some basic points of a reformulated, forward-looking
counterterrorism policy might be, and how it might relate to
questions of compliance with human rights norms.5 ° I leave
50. I draw here in part from a very interesting exercise sponsored by the Stanley
Foundation as part of its Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide project-bringing together
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aside the Iraq war altogether in this; I regard it as Joe Lieberman
does, as an integral part of the war on terror,51 but I understand
perfectly that this view is far from universally shared. First, we
might conceive comprehensive counterterrorism policy on a
continuum with the two extremes:
" The role of war. War has two distinct roles to play in
counterterrorism policy. War is a critically useful strategic
paradigm for understanding the long term struggle
against Islamist terror, just as it was in the Cold War. It is,
for one thing, how our opponents conceive of the strug-
gle, its purposes and future. It is the strategic prism by
which we can make decisions about offense and defense, a
home strategy or a forward one. Actual war in counterter-
rorism, however, war that meets the strict legal definition
of war-especially the large scale use of military force-is
not usually about fighting the terrorists themselves, since
they melt away into the background (Afghanistan and Pa-
kistan are the exception.). It is more typically about fight-
ing regimes- those that offer safe haven, on the one hand,
or those that threaten to provide terrorists with weapons
of mass destruction, on the other, on whatever criteria of
threat assessment a chastened post-Iraq war policy deems
advisable. War, both actual war and war as a strategic met-
aphor, is an essential tool of counterterrorism policy-but
not all counterterrorism policy is war, either. Actual war is
one extreme, aimed mostly against regimes.
" The role of law enforcement. If actual war represents one ex-
treme in the continuum of counterterrorism policy, the
other extreme is traditional law enforcement and the ap-
plication of the traditional domestic criminal law. On the
one hand, there is obviously a large role for law enforce-
ment in counterterrorism, especially domestically, and in
cooperation with law enforcement abroad. On the other
hand, as Judge Richard A. Posner, Michael Scheuer, An-
drew McCarthy, and many others have written, there can
center right and center left figures to write jointly on common ground and differences
between them on various foreign policy issues in advance of the 2008 election. I was
privileged to work with Elisa Massimino, Washington Director of Human Rights First, as
part of this project. See Kenneth Anderson & Elisa Massimino, The Cost of Confusion:
Resolving Ambiguities in Detainee Treatment (Stanley Foundation, 2007), http://
www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/other/MassAnder_07.pdf (last visited Apr.
11, 2007).
51. See Kimberly A. Strassel, The Weekend Interview with Joseph Lieberman: Unbowed,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2007, at Al1.
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be no return to the 1990s Clinton-era reliance upon post-
hoc law enforcement as the primary means of counterter-
rorism policy.52 The Moussaoui prosecution, to take one
prominent example, cannot be counted a success in
counterterrorism, much less a model. Traditional law
enforcement has a role, but it cannot be the core of
counterterrorism policy either for intelligence gathering
or enforcement/prevention.
If actual war, and likewise law enforcement, too, are limited
as means of counterterrorism, the question is what lies in the
broad middle ground between those two? I ask this partly for its
own sake-what should counterterrorism look like to be success-
ful as a whole enterprise? In the context of this discussion, how-
ever, I mean specifically to ask what relationship this (as yet un-
specified) middle ground has to human rights norms. After all,
the relationship of law enforcement, criminal justice, the crimi-
nal courts, to human rights norms is not fundamentally at issue,
despite various arguments at the margins. For that matter, too,
when it comes to actual war, the laws of war (while subject to
intense debate as to what it means when applied to situations not
obviously about war or battlefields in the ordinary, traditional
sense) are probably the most worked-out, refined set of rules in
all of international law. The two extremes of the counterterror-
ism spectrum are not really the human rights issue-whereas
what lies in the middle is the issue, precisely because so much of
it is unspecified and undefined.
Counterterrorism in the abstract consists of gathering infor-
mation on terrorist threats and then acting to prevent them.
The human rights issue of what this broad middle ground of
counterterrorism policy comprises, that which is neither war nor
criminal law enforcement, begins with questions of what law ap-
plies to it (or to any particular part of it), and how that law shall
be interpreted, by whom and in what fora. Although some have
52. See RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM IN
THE THROES OF REFORM 126-39 (2006); MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE
WEST is LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2004). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENT-
ING SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11 99-125 (2005)
(describing effective principles of intelligence gathering).
53. SeeJerry Markon, MartyrdomforMoussaoui?, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2006, atA9; see
also Editorial, Moussaoui Trial No Triumph for Prosecutors, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, Mar. 25, 2006, at A4 (describing how prosecutorial mistakes at the Moussaoui
trial send an international signal that compromises counterterrorism efforts).
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called for new international law regimes to address terrorism
and counterterrorism-a new Geneva Convention, perhaps, or a
new treaty, new treaty law is neither wise nor likely. States can-
not agree on so much as a definition of terrorism, let alone sub-
stantial counterterrorism rules. More prudent and more likely,
instead, is the development of domestic law legal regimes, condi-
tioned by international law of human rights. But disagreements
over the nature and application of these obligations promise
many, many disputes.
Some of the "middle ground" issues are presumptively not
hugely troubling from the human rights norm standpoint.
These include such things as efforts to disrupt terrorist financing
or information sharing among foreign intelligence services,5 4
and I will leave those aside. But others, framed as a domestic
legal regime of counterterrorism, raise deep civil liberties as well
as human rights issues, even as they are, I suggest, necessarily
core parts of a forward-going counterterrorism policy for a new
administration, whether Democratic or Republican:
* Surveillance issues: what is legal, what is not, and who
must review and approve decisions.
* The status of intelligence and other agents and their ac-
tions on foreign soil, either with knowledge and permis-
sion or without.
* Detention decisions: who makes them, and how they may
be challenged.
* Interrogation and what constitutes cruel, inhumane treat-
ment, etc., and the legal line of torture.
* Secrecy decisions-an overlooked aspect of counterterror-
ism policy-long present but now sharply at the forefront
of counterterrorism policy is the whole legal and adminis-
trative structure of classified information.55
* Decisions to release (or not release) terrorist suspects,
when, and to whom; rendition questions; the
54. See Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Coun-
tering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 61/171, at 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/171 (Dec. 19, 2006).
Although the extraordinary rendition cases now being developed in Europe change
that assessment in significant part. See Robert Marquand, Europe's Rising Unease Over
"Terror War, " CHRISTIAN Scl. MONITOR, Feb. 21, 2007, at 6; see also Souad Mekhennet &
Craig S. Smith, German Spy Agency Admits It Knew of "Rendition" by U.S., INT'L HERALD
TRIB., June 3, 2006, at 6 (describing foreign government knowledge of U.S. rendition
activities).
55. See Amand Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 Fordham
L.R. 1931 (2007).
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(un)willingness of governments to take back their nation-
als; and the possibility of indemnification for mistaken de-
tention.
" How to try detainees for alleged crimes, by whom and
under what legal regime and in what fora with what legal
protections.
* The use of force (short of the legal definition of war) in
assassination, abduction, detention, destruction of terror-
ist materiel, etc.-what law applies to regulate this con-
duct and what should the substantive standards be?
5 6
Under a forward-looking counterterrorism policy, these will
figure prominently among the many issues for which super-
power compliance with international norms is debated. For
some of these, at least, I can suggest some answers.
* A civilian national security court. My view is that it is time to
create a national security court, with judges drawn from
the existing circuit courts, civilian in nature, with special
rules for procedure, evidence, and so on. The United
States could usefully draw upon the experience of West-
ern Europe with regards to national security courts and
special counterterrorism laws.57 The rules of the interna-
tional criminal tribunals which in, for example, the case of
the Yugoslavian tribunal permit wide latitude with respect
to hearsay and other evidence, are also instructive. Such a
court would have at least two separate roles. First, it would
take over from the military in any military commission
cases determining guilt under any MCA-type prosecution.
Second, it would, ideally, serve as the forum periodically
to review the factual basis of, and ongoing need for, what
should amount to legislatively defined administrative de-
tention in other cases. The military, for its part, should be
limited to dealing with detainees taken on battlefields as
ordinarily defined in the legal definition of war. (This
would not, however, eliminate all instances of military de-
tainees at Guantanamo, however, many of whom were
56. For a recent scholarly attempt to address these issues specifically, see Gregory
S. McNeal & Brian Field, Snatch-and-Grab Ops: Justifying Extraterritorial Abduction (Case
Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper 07-3, 2007), http://ssm.com/
abstract=961048 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
57. The differences are sometimes instructive, as I found studying such differences
on sabbatical in Spain in 2004. See Bret Stephens, Who Needs Jacques Bauer?, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 20, 2007, at A16; see also David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Europe's Runaway
Prosecutions, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2007, at A19.
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taken on battlefields as ordinarily defined in the laws of
war.) .58
Close Guantanamo. I do not say this as one of the Adminis-
tration's legion critics; I supported its creation and think
that it served a useful purpose from the outset of the war
on terror. Nor does this mean releasing the so-called
handful of high-value detainees-Khalid Sheikh Moham-
med, et al.-but they are a tiny handful of the total. At the
same time, I simply urge dropping the criminal charges
now lodged in military commissions against several score
Guantanamo detainees, and releasing them. (The compli-
cations of repatriation to countries, such as China, that
might mistreat them, or to countries, including Britain
and Germany, that in some cases do not want their nation-
als back, even as they bitterly criticize the existence of
Guantanamo detentions, are left aside here.)5" Near total
release of the Guantanamo detainees is not as morally
clean as it might seem to those for whom Guantanamo
detainees consist entirely, or almost entirely, of innocent
shepherds sold by the Northern Alliance. Some of the de-
tainees-Hamdan himself, for example, given his admit-
ted role-are indeed worthy of detention and punishment
as part of al-Qaeda. Others were taken in what appear to
be relatively clear cut violations of the laws of war on a
traditionally defined Afghanistan battlefield. Moreover, as
one Defense Department source remarked to me off-the-
record, if we do let the detainees go en masse, the result is
likely to be at least some additional people killed, as at
least some of these people over time return to the fight.
On the other hand (continued this source) the dead are
more likely not to be U.S. citizens. Finally, closing Guan-
tanamo, whatever the public relations value of doing so,
does not remove the fundamental point that, without
question, the United States will continue to detain people
in counterterrorism; and it needs a policy for dealing with
detentions post-Guantanamo. Bringing detainees into the
regular U.S. criminal justice system is an enormous mis-
take, and so closing Guantanamo only makes sense in the
58. It is noteworthy that the lead defense counsel for Hamdan against the U.S.
Government, Georgetown Law Professor Neal Katyal, has endorsed the idea of a na-
tional security court. See Stuart Taylor Jr., The Case for a National Security Court, NAT'LJ.,
Mar. 26, 2007.
59. Craig Whitlock, 82 Inmates Cleared But Still Held at Guantanamo, WASH. POST,
Apr. 29, 2007, at Al.
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context of a new, comprehensive counterterrorism court
and legal regime-not a very likely prospect, of course.
Institutionalize comprehensive counterterrorism policy through
legislation, and require Congress to share ownership of it. One
profound effect of the Cheney faction's focus on execu-
tive power within the Bush Administration has been that it
has let Congress off the hook in having to take, and share,
responsibility for U.S. counterterrorism policy. So long as
the Bush Administration is willing-masochistically-to
take all the heat, in the name of protecting executive
power, for every counterterrorism policy, for all of it, Con-
gress will not easily on its own step up and accept responsi-
bility for any of it. And the Bush Administration, even as
its term of office runs to a close, seems oblivious to the
advantages of institutionalizing counterterrorism policy
through legislation that will be around long after the Ad-
ministration is gone. The Administration seems oblivious
to the fact that what lives by executive discretion also dies
by executive discretion-and if counterterrorism is as im-
portant as the Administration says it is, and in the specific
ways it says, it ought to seek to make its counterterrorism
policy the permanent policy of the United States through
legislation. I obviously have strong views on what counter-
terrorism policy should be; still more important is that, in
a democratic system, the legislature share and enact such
policies for the long term, whatever they substantively hap-
pen to be.60
These and other domestic legal measures will raise impor-
tant questions of the application of international human rights
norms. Much of the human rights debate up to this point has
taken place in the context of the application of the laws of war.6"
If counterterrorism policy were reformed along the lines I sug-
gest, however-with a concomitant emphasis on civilian, rather
than military structures-some part of the discussion naturally
would shift away from the laws of war toward the specific applica-
tion of human rights law with respect to such practices as admin-
istrative detention. There would be, unquestionably, many dis-
putes over the applicability, interpretation, and flexibility of
60. See Kenneth Anderson, It's Congress's War, Too, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 3, 2006,
at 20; Kenneth Anderson, Law and Terror, 139 POL'Y REv. 3 (Oct. & Nov. 2006) (discuss-
ing Congress's role in enacting these policies).
61. See, e.g., Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying The Laws of
War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580 (2006).
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human rights norms. On many of those issues, the United States
has strong and long pronounced views; I do not suppose there
would be much agreement forthcoming in those debates.
But even in the midst of those debates, I would caution,
once again, that while there are indeed differences in how a
Democratic administration would view these matters from how a
Republican one would, those differences are less than might be
thought. Perhaps, for example, a Democratic administration
would reverse the course of decades of U.S. views on the territo-
rial application of the ICCPR and treat it as applying extraterri-
torially-thus giving at least an arguable international human
rights purchase for example, in the case of the use of force by
the United States abroad short of war, for example, in abduc-
tions or assassinations. Or perhaps a U.S. judge might be willing
to do so.
But, for what it is worth, I rather doubt a Democratic admin-
istration would do so. A return of the Democratic Party to the
presidency would require Democrats to take ownership of
counterterrorism in ways that they have not so far had to do,
given the willingness of an executive-power obsessed Bush Ad-
ministration to treat practically all of the war on terror as an ex-
ercise in pure executive discretion-and so taking all responsi-
bility for it. We have yet to see how a Democratic administration
and Congress would conduct counterterrorism if policy truly be-
longed to them.
6.
The Meek Multilateralist?
Insofar, therefore, as many of the burning issues of U.S.
compliance with human rights norms today have to do with the
war on terror, there are possibilities in the future that might bet-
ter satisfy human rights critics of the United States while still sat-
isfying U.S. security concerns. Not on everything, and not neces-
sarily as the critics might like. Still, if the attention could be fo-
cused at least partly forward and not entirely backwards, there
are possibilities for restructuring counterterrorism policy that
would even satisfy someone like me (who, at the end of the day,
supports the Bush Administration's overall policy), while at least
partly satisfying human rights critics. Maybe, maybe not. Let me
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close these remarks, however, with a consideration of a quite dif-
ferent sort.
Conventional wisdom seems to be that the United States has
quite exhausted itself with war-perhaps not unlike its exhaus-
tion with war following Vietnam. Not everyone shares that view,
but conventional wisdom says no more wars for a good while.6 2
From the European point of view, that does not make the U.S.
security guarantee any less good, but rather better because, for
Europe, U.S. counterterrorism wars simply stir up Islamist ter-
rorists in Europe's own cities, places that cannot be attacked by
the 82nd Airborne. What such exhaustion most likely leads to is
a return to the policies and, more precisely, of the sensibilities, of
the early Clinton era, perhaps with an added air, in a Demo-
cratic administration at least, of contrition for the wicked Bush
years. It is a sensibility expressed to the considerable satisfaction
of Western European allies, as "meek multilateralism."
But recall what that "meek multilateralism" served in those
early Clinton years. It was a "get along, go along" foreign policy
not really interested in anything foreign other than trade. 63 It
was willing, most of the time, to say all the right multilateralist
things because the Clinton Administration came to power by
promising to focus on domestic issues. It was always willing to
feel everyone's pain for anything out in the world. But it was
much less willing to act. It wanted to be multilateralist precisely
in order (partly, but only partly, through lip service compliance
with all those international norms), to try and be just another
power in the multilateral gaggle of nation states-whose compli-
ance, after all, is partly just lip service, too.
But just being one of the guys, so to speak, doesn't work for
the United States, of course. And it doesn't work for the rest of
the world either. What? Really, really rely on the promise of col-
lective security through the U.N.? Who are we kidding? Within
a few years the Clinton Administration was in a different
62. For example, Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan, two prominent foreign policy
analysts of the center left and right, respectively, are releasing ajoint paper arguing that
the United States will be no less bellicose in a new administration than under Bush. See
Ivo Daalder & Robert Kagan, America and the Use of Force (Stanley Foundation, forthcom-
ing 2007).
63. SeeJuanJ. Walte & Marilyn Greene, U.S. Policy From Sea to Sea, USA TODAY, Dec.
17, 1993, at IlA.
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mode 64-but it wasn't willingly, and it wasn't for lack of desire to
loom small on the world stage. We therefore face, under either
a Democratic or Republican administration, the possibility of a
return to a form of meek multilateralism by the United States. It
might actually be more compliant with international law norms.
It might be much more respectful of international law as the
international law professors see it. It would almost certainly be
more soothing to the sensitivities, so offended by the Bush Ad-
ministration, of the international community. One might wish
that the United States would essentially submit its power to su-
pervision and control by its allies and friends and take instruc-
tion from them, but that seems unlikely, the much more likely
scenario is talking a humble, virtuous talk-and passivity as
much and as long as possible."
The actual choice is much more likely this: On the one
hand, a meek multilateralism that masks a deep desire to ignore,
at least for some quite possibly critical years, the responsibilities
and obligations of the superpower, in order not to be seen to be
exercising its privileges, and also, frankly, to lick its wounds. Or,
on the other hand, the robust assertion of U.S. exceptionalism,
even to the point of special privilege, arrogant as that always in
fact is, and infuriating to the rest of the United States' friends
and allies as that always is, and less compliant and respectful of
others' views of international law and the international system,
64. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, The Path to Crisis: How the United States and its Allies
went to War, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1999, at Al.
65. One reason is that, although the United States is fully capable of moral and
legal mistakes, submitting one's power to the supervision even of one's friends invites-
quite apart from its preposterousness from a strictly realist standpoint-the "give a
mouse a cookie" problem, the inevitable tendency to demand more and more of the
superpower as a condition of continuing to like it. I leave aside here, as too large a topic
for these remarks, the currently popular idea of a "caucus of the democracies" that
might provide a robust yet less evidently insincere forum in which the United States
could argue its views, find greater grounds of agreement, and generally have a place
among those who share its fundamental values against which to check its own behavior
and achieve some agreement and coordination. See HUNTLEY, supra note 26 (calling for
the institutionalization of global democratic dominance); Kenneth Anderson, United
Nations Reform and the Agendas of Human Rights and Democracy 10-11 (Sept. 30 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/internationalhrcolloqui
um/documents/UNreformHRGeorgetown7OctO5.doc (last visited Apr. 11, 2007); see
also COUNCIL FOR A COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES, A COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES: THE
EVOLUTION OF A MOVEMENT, http://www.ccd2l.org/team/index.htm (last visited Mar.
31, 2007) (discussing history and development of the Community of Democracies);
Ikenberry & Slaughter, supra note 5.
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such as it is. The latter choice may not rise, in a new administra-
tion, to the Bush Administration's specially calibrated levels of
bellicosity, but it would not be a return to the early 1990s, either.
Think carefully upon which you prefer.
